Knowledge-based economy and social exclusion: shadows and lights in the roman socio-economic model by Pasquale De Muro et al.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMYAND SOCIAL EXCLUSION:  
SHADOWS AND LIGHTS IN THE ROMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODEL
Pasquale De Muro    Salvatore Monni    Pasquale Tridico 
COLLANA DEL
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA
Working Paper n° 91, 2008- I “Working Papers” del Dipartimento di Economia svolgono la funzione di divulgare 
tempestivamente, in forma definitiva o provvisoria, i risultati di ricerche scientifiche
originali. La loro pubblicazione è soggetta all’approvazione del Comitato Scientifico.
- Per ciascuna pubblicazione vengono soddisfatti gli obblighi previsti dall’art. 1 del D.L.L.
31.8.1945, n. 660 e successive modifiche.
- Copie della presente pubblicazione possono essere richieste alla Redazione.
REDAZIONE:
Dipartimento di Economia
Università degli Studi Roma Tre
Via Silvio D'Amico, 77 - 00145 Roma
Tel. 0039-06-57335655  fax 0039-06-57335771
E-mail: dip_eco@uniroma3.itDIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA
Comitato Scientifico:
Proff. M.  Causi
S. Fadda
C.M. Travaglini
* Dipartimento di Economia, Università degli Studi “Roma Tre”
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMYAND SOCIAL EXCLUSION:  
SHADOWS AND LIGHTS IN THE ROMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODEL
Pasquale De Muro    Salvatore Monni    Pasquale Tridico *     Knowledge-based economy and social exclusion:
Pasquale De Muro, Salvatore Monni and Pasquale Tridico
1
Department of Economics, Università degli Studi Roma Tre
Abstract
The paper analyses the changed development path of the metropolitan area of Rome. It aims to analyse
the evolution and modernization of Rome in the last thirty years and to examine whether or not the consequent
cultural regeneration promotes social cohesion. To this end we focus on both structural and institutional change
in Rome, trying to identify the main ruptures and continuities in the development path, as well as the driving
forces of the new model.
After WWII, Rome was generally considered to be a cumbersome capital city, with a heavy
bureaucracy sector and without any strong “local” political forces and social movements capable of bringing
about economic and political change. Nevertheless, a new and more democratic local governance and sub-
regulation mode have emerged during the post-Fordist era, which have allowed for the production and
reproduction of new socioeconomic relations that in turn influenced a new economic model for the city. This
new governance is an important leading theme; it brings about some interesting forms of “democratisation” that
are difficult to find in other post-Fordist metropolises.
The new economic model is characterised, on the one hand, by the development of the advanced tertiary
sector, i.e., knowledge intensive services, tourism services, business services, cultural industries, R&D activities.
On the other hand, the Roman model is also characterised – in line with other national and global metropolises –
by forms of social exclusion, a new poor, and polarisation between the peripheries and central/high income
districts, in a sort of multi-speed development. At the same time, the traditional bureaucracy and its connected
“state bourgeoisie”, although still relevant, are no longer dominant. New service activities have brought about
new agents, new powers and new institutions.
In addition to a review of the literature and an analysis of existing statistics, interviews were undertaken
with informed political leaders and economic and social actors of the emblematic moments of change in order to
capture the driving forces of the new development path.
Keywords: urban modernization, knowledge-based economy, human development
JEL:O 15, O18
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shadows and lights in the Roman socio-economic model2
"Any city, however small, is in fact 
divided into two, one the city of the 
poor, the other of the rich; these are at 
war with one another."
Plato, The Republic
1. Introduction
Over the last thirty years, Rome experienced a dramatic change that has involved
economic and social actors, political relations and power relations. A different agency
framework shaped a new path of socioeconomic development. A new local governance and
sub-regulation mode emerged during the 1990s; this led to the production and reproduction of
new socioeconomic relations that in turn evolved into a new economic model for the city
2.
This new model is mainly characterized by a path of structural change that is more
oriented towards information and communication technology, mass tourism, finance,
advanced services, audiovisual industry (Comune di Roma, 2006a),
3 culture and R&D, i.e.,
the so called knowledge-based economy. Culture, in this model, is regarded as a key
ingredient for contemporary urban regeneration (Garcia and Degen, 2007).
This allowed consistent growth in the city’s economy. However, at the same time, the
Roman model is characterized by forms of social exclusion and polarization between
peripheries and central/wealthy districts in a type of multi-speed development. A new poor
sector emerged, not only in the peripheries and in the lowest social classes, but also in the
middle class. Weak parts of society did not enjoy the benefits of advanced tertiary sector
growth. Insufficient attention is paid to the peripheral areas; poverty is not reduced; unskilled
workers are affected by forms of social exclusion; the middle class suffers an increased cost
of living; booming house prices exclude a large part of the lower-middle class from buying a
house; renting a house is very expensive; inequality is rising, etc. These phenomena are also
affected by central government policies introduced in the last ten years, such as the laws that
contributed to “flexible” job contracts. This kind of contract affects in particular the young,
women and immigrants who live in the peripheries. According to Jessop (2003) the results of
all this change in social policies influenced by the neo liberal agenda together with the local
private interests are now assuming a prominent role in urban development.
2 As imilar process characterises other cities, like Barcelona (Garcia and Degen, 2007).
3 The Roman audiovisual industry includes the traditional movie district of Cinecittà,e s t a b lished by the Fascist
government, the radio and television industry, and other multimedia firms.3
Recent research commissioned by the regional government
4 underlines the fact that a
large part of the population is affected by a type of “opulence-related distress” (disagio da
benessere) (Regione Lazio, 2002). This means that although resources are abundant, many
people remain excluded because of a lack of opportunities, social occasions, inclusive social
relations, adequate local institutions, etc. 
Although Rome was never a “traditional” Fordist city,
5 this kind of multi-speed
development is, in a way, a consequence of the post-Fordist regime of accumulation,
characterized by the knowledge economy and labour flexibility on one side, and by social
exclusion and insufficient social protection on the other. Economically, those outside the
dynamic advanced sectors, mainly the unskilled and/or older workers and migrants, do not
benefit from the new economic model and its expansion.
At the same time, the traditional bureaucracy and the connected “state bourgeoisie”,
although they still carry weight, are no longer dominant. The new socioeconomic model
seems to bring new agents, new institutions, new forms of participation and social innovation.
In general, this emerging economy and society is more democratically governed: experiments
in participatory budget, socioeconomic forums (“Patto per Roma”), decentralization,
multicultural policies, political rights for migrants (right to vote, active and passive, for
migrants in the local councils), more democratic social and urban policies, policies for
peripheral areas, etc. However, for many people, this new kind of governance and social
innovation is very distant and, as we show in the fourth section, there is a dark side to the
model’s positive lights.
The following table, to which we refer throughout the paper, synthesises the
periodization of main events and changes in Rome after the Second World War.
4 Rome is within the Lazio region. Most of regional population and economic activities are concentrated in the
Rome metropolitan area, encompassing the city and its labour district, i.e, the periphery, the surrounding
hinterland, the southern and eastern manufacturing area.
5 We use the terms Fordist and Fordism as defined in Boyer and Saillard (1995).4
Table 1: Periodization of Roman socioeconomic development
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2. The production structure of Rome during Fordism
After the Second World War (WW2), Italy started a huge programme of industrial re-
construction, which led to the economic miracle of the 1950s and 60s. Public investment was
crucial to that programme. Rome was only marginally involved in this industrial
restructuring; the Italian Government’s main task for Rome was the building of a modern
capital city for the new republic. 
Public capital focused on bureaucratic and administrative structures. Conversely,
private capital, as described by Toscano (2006), focused on the small manufacturing sector
The South-Eastern part of Rome, in particular, received significant investment in specific
sectors, such as the chemical, wood, pharmaceutical and building industries, at least until the
1970s when private investment started to move towards the more innovative and
technological advanced tertiary sector (Toscano, 2006).
Until the 1960s, the Lazio region was still very heterogeneous in economic terms and
a large part of it was poor and agriculturally oriented. In this context, Rome was not an
exception when compared with its region. Many neighbourhoods were poor and affected by
environmental degradation. At the same time, the city was architecturally splendid and
potentially very rich, with an overall increasing development trend.
The South-eastern part of the city was industrially dynamic and many investors
decided to locate factories there. Previous to WW2, an industrial cluster
6 had already been
built in the area between Tiburtina and Prenestina (the Eastern area of Rome). There were
some fiscal advantages for private firms in choosing to locate their factories there. The war
impeded the development of a true industrial district,
7 and in general, there was little progress
in terms of industrial development in Rome and Lazio during the Fascist era. After WW2, an
effective industrial cluster was rebuilt, and in 1950, law no. 647 introduced incentives for
firms in the South-eastern area.
In the south of Rome, during the 1950s and, even more in the 1960s, the industrial
sector showed consistent growth. This area was covered by Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the
national agency for the development of Southern Italy (D’Antonio, 1997; Cafiero, 2000),
which favoured industrial settlements (Almagià, 1976). It became very dynamic and the most
industrialized  in the Lazio region.
6 For a definition of cluster see Porter (1990).
7 The difference between a cluster and a district is illustrated by Bellandi (2003).6
In the period between 1951 and 1961, the economy of the province of Rome grew
significantly. The Roman contribution to the national GDP was 5.7% in 1951, rising to 7.7%
in 1961. The Roman rate of economic growth was higher than the national one; at the same
time, the residential population of the province of Rome grew by 27% in the 1950s, while the
average population growth in the other Italian provinces was 6.2% (Toscano, 2006). In
particular, in the period 1951-55, the economic growth of Rome was faster than the national
growth rate, and although in 1956-1961 the trend was lower than the rest of Italy, it was still
very important (Pieraccioni, 1962).
The main deficiencies of Rome were the small number of large industrial firms, the
weakness of the machinery sector, and the poor integration between agriculture and the
industrial sector. In 1961, there were only two industrial firms with more than 1,000
employees in Rome (two machinery firms, i.e. Fatme and Fiorentini), 20 firms with more than
500 employees and 74 firms with more than 100 employees. Rome did not have an industrial
heritage. Comparison with Milan – the leading industrial metropolitan area in Italy– showed
the huge industrial fragility of the capital: 60,000 employees in the manufacturing sector in
Rome in 1961 versus 450.000 in Milan (Orlando, 1964). The purchasing power of the citizens
was very limited, therefore internal demand was very constrained. The general industrial
framework of Rome in the 1950-1960s was very fragmented, characterized by small
enterprises, connected mainly with political lobbies and speculative activities, and therefore
with limited perspective and ambition to expand. The demographic explosion in Rome did not
lead to the founding of appropriate economic structures, such as large companies, to balance
the demand and supply of labour, as occurred in North-western industrial cities such as Milan
and Turin. An important consumer middle class took time to appear. A major problem was
the backward agricultural sector was and its non-integration with industry. Low profits and
income in the countryside did not allow mass consumption (Lizzadri, 1954). As stated by
Séronde-Baboneaux (1983), Rome was too “Southern” to be integrated into the more dynamic
North and too “Northern” to be integrated into the South and to take advantage of it.
In 1964, for the first time after WW2, the income composition of the province of
Rome started to change in favour of the tertiary sector. Agriculture and industry decreased,
(4.7% and 61% respectively of the GDP of the province of Rome), while the public
administration sector (22.6%) and other services (11.6%) grew. This was the starting point of
a process that continues to this day and that, to some extent, is the basis of the so-called
“advanced tertiary” sector, which is very important in the present-day Roman economy
(Toscano, 2006).7
3. The roots of the socioeconomic change: ruptures and continuities at the sunset of 
Fordism
The effects of the crisis of Fordism were different in Rome than in the industrial
regions of Italy and Europe. Rome did not experience the industrial recession and the
consequent restructuring experienced in the North. On the contrary, the economic growth of
Rome during the seventies was still significant, while the rest of the Peninsula was in
recession. In an enlightening sentence, Congi (1977) stated that Rome become modern
without passing through development.
8
Alongside the traditional housing sector, a modern service sector emerged during
those years favoured by the expansion of tourism, the massive access to university education,
the expansion of the research sector, the birth of technological poles, and all the activities
connected with these sectors. On the one hand, within the national context of peripheral
Fordism, the Roman economy was only marginally interested in the industrial transformation
in the Southern and Eastern parts of the metropolitan borders. On the other hand, the tertiary
development of Rome in these years was strongly linked to its particular function within the
Italian Fordist accumulation regime, which has been labelled “public neo-capitalism”. Rome,
in fact, was the headquarters for all the State-related economic institutions, such as the
banking system
9, the State holding system
10, the telecommunications public companies
11,
public agencies for regional development
12, public and semi-public research institutions
13, and
the national membership and trade union associations, together with a strong concentration of
private professional consulting companies servicing such headquarters and feeding on State
spending. This whole system, strongly integrated into the political administrative structure
(ministries, parliament, political parties) constitutes what Pugliese (1979) has labelled the
“Great State Bourgeoisie”.
From a socio-political point of view, at the end of the 1960s, the fragmented and weak
working class became both less heterogeneous and more important in the Roman context. The
social change followed the economic dynamics (Congi, 1977). After the experience of 1968’s
movements, students and workers could re-think new forms of organization. The Roman
8 Congi, evidently, refers to the mainstream concept of development as “economic growth cum structural
change” rather that development as expansion of people’s capabilities.
9 Banca d’Italia, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Roma, Banco di Santo Spirito, Istituto Mobiliare
Italiano, Medio Credito.
10 IRI, ENI, EFIM, ITALSIEL, ITALSTAT.
11 STET/SIP, RAI, ALITALIA.
12 Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, FORMEZ, IASM.
13 CNR, ISCO, ISPE, INEA, ENEA, SVIMEZ, ISFOL.8
working class built up an identity that was only partly linked to the industrial sector. As stated
by Congi (1977), after 1968 the Roman working class broke its inferiority complex and
understood that a working class identity and movement was still alive despite the smallness of
although the industrial sector was small. An heterogeneous working class, together with
intellectuals and students, participated in an evolutionary process of social change which was
to have important effects on the future development model of Rome and on the governance
dimension of the city in particular.
From an economic point of view, after the Italian economic miracle of the 1950s and
1960s, there were two path dependencies to consider in the capital city of Italy. The first was
linked to the absence of a traditional Fordist regime; this has been very useful for the actual
socioeconomic development model of the Rome of today. In particular, when a post-Fordist
industrial transformation started in Europe and in many Italian regions, in Rome there were
neither large industrial firms to transform nor a recession to remedy. On the contrary, there
was an active intellectual social group, an emerging workers movement, a number of skilled
workers available for employment in the promising tourism sector, a growing small
manufacturing sector, as well as the traditional bureaucracy and the housing sector neither of
which asked for any transformation.
The second path dependency is linked to the State bourgeoisie. The new economic
model of Rome, which is knowledge- and services-oriented, can be considered to some extent
as an evolutionary continuity based on a system of public institutions such as banks, public
research centres, parties and associations, etc. Hence, this second path-dependency could play
a positive role in the further development of Rome, characterized by an advanced tertiary
sector made up of: 1) the formation of a modern tourism industry; 2) the development of the
audiovisual industry; 3) an exploding housing sector; 4) the evolution of the financial cluster;
5) the restructuring of the research and technology cluster; 5) the full development of a mass
university pole represented by “La Sapienza”, the biggest university in Europe with almost
200,000 students in that period. 
These two path dependencies seem to be the basis of the new socioeconomic model of
Rome today, which appears to be characterized by two dimensions:
1. on the production side, a knowledge-based economy 
2. on the political side, a more democratic governance.
The first one is expressed by the advanced service sector, the R&D sector and the
combination of the financial and housing sector. These sectors produce most of the GDP of
Rome.9
The new governance model expressed by the two latest city councils is characterized by a
more democratic approach, which, as stated previously, found its origins in the social
movements of the late 1960s and the 1970s that allowed a democratic evolution and the
integration of the “popular class” in the decision process. 
These two dimensions emerged clearly after “the turn” of 1993 and seem to have
strengthened in the current government (a centre-left coalition) led by the mayor, Walter
Veltroni. However, there are some downsides to this socioeconomic model, represented by
the fact that many people remain at the margins of either the advanced tertiary economy or the
democratic process, which involve almost exclusively the intellectual elites and the higher-
educated.
4. Transition towards post-Fordism: KBE and the new socioeconomic model
14
During the Seventies and the Eighties, a modernization process began in Rome.
Private firms started to focus their investments on the tertiary sector, both traditional and 
advanced. This helped the Roman economy to grow significantly while the rest of Italy was in 
the middle of the Fordist crisis (Toscano, 2006).
The social and political transformation process experienced by Rome during this
period affected, in turn, the economic growth path. The shift towards the tertiary sector not
only supported regional economic growth but also gave to the area the aspect of a highly
“tertiarized region”. Entrepreneurs during this period were better educated and possessed a
wider cultural background than the first generation of entrepreneurs, who were mainly
landowners from the Fascist period. Social transformation in both the educational and value
systems during 1960-1970 also contributed to the change. Moreover, the rise of social
movements and trade unionism in the 1970s discouraged investors from traditional industrial
sectors, and led to a preference for the advanced tertiary sector with its more skilled workers.
As early as the 1980s, all these factors enabled the Roman economy to become ,a
service-oriented economy, as in most of the metropolitan areas in high-income countries. An
innovative model emerged where economic and extra-economic factors played an important
role in mediating reproduction and mode of production. On the one hand, the Roman
experience can be interpreted as a “territorial innovation model” (Moulaert 2006); on the
other, Rome is a case where institutional forms as well as mechanisms and strategies of
14 This paragraph contains reference to the interview made to prof. Pia Toscano (20 October 2006) and to the
interview made to dr. Luca Lo Bianco (Director of the Department of Economic and Development Policy ,
Municipality of Rome, 8 September 2006).10
regulation, extra-economic factors, national law, agreements, informal practices, juridical-
political regulation etc., influence the accumulation and reproduction of the socioeconomic
system and the emergence of the predicted new model (Jessop and Swyngedouw, 2006).
Many different advanced tertiary activities
15 are located in Rome, representing
approximately 91% of Lazio’s tertiary sector. Furthermore, during the 1980s, and even more
in the following decade, the industrial cluster within Rome became bigger and the eastern
axes along the Tiburtina road became the core of a technological pole, competing with the
Rome-Latina southern axes that represented the Capital’s more traditional industrial cluster.
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15 That are: financial and real estate activities; rent industrial machines and equipments; computer science
activities; scientific research & development; business services for firms.11
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Figures 1 and 2 show the strong dynamics of both business services activity (almost
100.000 employees in 2001) and computer services activity. Conversely, the financial real
estate sector, an activity strictly linked to the more traditional building construction sector, is
quite stable with less than 20,000 employees in 2001.
A comparison with the rest of Italy clearly shows the strong increase of the advanced
tertiary sector in Rome and therefore in the whole region. Lazio’s advanced tertiary sector is
second only to Lombardia, the most industrialized region of the country. Lazio experienced a
dramatic change during the 1980s and 1990s. The rate of growth between 1991 and 2001 was
52%, (second to Lombardia), while the rate of growth during 1981-2001 was the highest in
Italy (Toscano, 2006). 
During the 1990s Rome continued along the trajectory of socio-economic change
started at the end of the seventies. Moreover, during the 1990s, the socio-economic trajectory
was coupled with a political strategy which brought about a new governance model made up
of wider social participation, an extension of social rights, a more democratic process and
form of participation, decentralization at municipal level, a public forum where municipal
decisions were supposed to be taken, etc. In general, the municipal government made a huge
effort to give Rome a new look, a new polity, and new development policies. Rutelli (1993-
2001) and Veltroni (2001-present) were the new mayors of the city during this period
However, much of this effort remained at the level of discourse and was insubstantial, as we12
discuss in the next paragraph. The discourse itself also assumes a positive relation between
successful economic competition with other cities and social cohesion within the city (Garcia
and Degen, 2007)
During the 1990s, a new but still unstable regime of accumulation emerged also in
Rome as in the rest of Europe (Jessop and Sum 2005; Tickell and Peck , 2003; Jessop, 2001;
Boyer and Durand, 1997). It is characterized by a flexible accumulation regime, and by a
marked uneven or multi-speed development, with a crucial role assigned to information and
communication technology (ICT) and to knowledge in general, with the emphasis reversed on
the knowledge-based economy (KBE). 
As Petit (2003: 20) pointed out, in the transition to post-Fordism, institutions are
evolving and institutional forms of competition in particular tend to prevail in the emerging
regime. Commenting on this argument, Boyer (2005) says that in the advanced economies
during the transition period, the prevailing form in the “hierarchy of the institutional forms”
seems to be the finance sector, (2005: 4), which shapes the other institutions (2005: 18).
However, both agree that the KBE is a prevailing post-Fordist feature in Europe and in other
advanced economies. The notion of KBE can be useful for the neo-liberal conception of
territorial competitiveness, and can be functional for introducing policies and institutions
oriented toward labour cost reduction, capital intensive production process, financialisation
and terziarization of modern economies, with a consequent harmful impact on unskilled
workers and with negative effects in terms of uneven development and inequality.
5. Local politics: between discourse and reality 
The work of Rutelli, mayor of Rome between 1993-2001, was continued by his
successor, Veltroni, elected first in 2001 and re-elected with a huge consensus in 2006.
Veltroni propounded a rhetoric of Rome as a community. He created some political
tools and progressive democratic forms of participation such as elected migrant
representatives on the City Council, a participatory budget, political forums etc. However, as
we will see, a lot of shadows still remain around such a model of governance. The poor,
young precarious workers, migrants and citizens living in rundown areas remain at the
margins of this model and gain only minor benefits from the modernization of Rome.
Nevertheless, through discourse, the media, a well promoted image of himself, participation
in all the social events of Roman public life, and the organization of a well sustained cultural
life in Rome, the new mayor was able to create an imaginary version of the city that was
different from reality, and to create consensus (AA.VV, 2007). 13
In fact, from a cultural-political point of view, intensive discourse accompanied the
economic performance of Roman economy. The aim of this model, of which Rome is just one
example, is to promote modernization and growth within the KBE.
The KBE concept has become very fashionable in official discourses and documents.
It conjures up a world of smart people, with smart jobs, doing smart things, in smart ways, for
smart money, increasingly open to all rather than to a few. It has become the dominant
economic strategy in Rome as in many countries, regions, and cities and is endorsed by many
economic, political, and social forces. However, it has also been criticized for creating a
digital divide, new forms of social exclusion, and for restricting access to high education
(Jessop, 2000). While some accept the idea that we are in, or moving towards, some form of
KBE, others reject the very notion of KBE, or consider its actuality and future to be deeply
problematic. Yet others take agnostic positions or want to acquire more evidence. Whichever
of these positions is most appropriate, there remain questions that cannot be ignored. 
Following Taylor’s work on European Metropolis Network Connectivity, one can
observe that Rome, together with Berlin, ranks 53
rd in the world and 18
th in Europe as regards
Global Network Connectivity; this is an indicator drawn from the number of service firms in a
city also having offices elsewhere in the world. These rankings underline the fact that the
level of Roman global networking is still low, although its evolution towards a global network
is proceeding fast (Taylor, 2002). However, as table 2 shows, Rome scores a bit better with
regard to Banking/finance connectivity and to NGOs network connectivity and Research
network links in particular. In these last, Rome scores in the top 25 cities in the world at 18
th
and 17
th respectively. These rankings are, to some extent, also a measure of the intensity of
the Knowledge Society.14






































































6. An outlook of Rome from an income perspective: growth and modernization
16
In 2006, the population of Rome was 2,663,182 per 1,350 KM/square of territory.
Rome is the biggest municipality in Italy in terms of territorial extension and population. In
2004, the rate of growth in GDP was 6.7%; in the same year the rate of growth for Italy was
1.9%, and for the province of Rome, 2.7%. Rome’s GDP in 2005 was 94,376 billion Euros,
which is 63% of the regional GDP and 81% of the provincial GDP. However, the population
of the city of Rome is 71% of the total for the whole province of Rome and 64% of the Lazio
region. During the last five years, 2001-05, Rome was growing much faster compared with
the rest of Italy (Censis 2006).
17 Its GDP growth was 4.1% as against 1.4% for Italy; its GDP
per capita was 30,500 , while the Italian GDP per capita was 25,200 .
16All the data about Rome economy used in this paragraph are from Comune di Roma (2006).
17 In this Annual Rapport Rome is defined as the engine of the Italian economic recovery.15
Table  3. Per capita value added among the richest Italian cities ()
2004 rank 2001 Rank 1995
Milan 30629 1 29452 1 22367 1
Bolzano 29953 2 26670 2 20235 3
Bologna 28332 3 26238 3 20225 4
Modena 27691 4 26053 4 20560 2
Florence 27585 5 24589 6 17937 12
Mantova 26873 6 22644 18 18710 8
Rome 26350 7 23121 11 17358 20
Parma 26024 8 25370 5 19139 7
Aosta 25024 9 23840 7 19700 5
Bergamo 24988 10 21667 23 17647 18
Italy 20761 18984 14457
Source: Comune di Roma, 2006b
The contribution to the national GDP was 6.3% in 2001 and 6.7% in 2005. The
number of firms increased during the same period by 9.2%, while in Italy it increased by
4.5%. The same trend is observable in the employment figures. 











Figure 4. Value added, annual change 2001-2004, current prices, (%), main Italian cities
Source: Unioncamere-Istituto Tagliacarne 
However, in comparison with other European capital cities, Rome has a lower GDP
per capita than London, Frankfurt, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Milan, but higher than
Madrid and Berlin (Eurostat, 2005). 



















Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data, 2005
In 2005 the main contribution to the growth of value added came from the agriculture
sector. However, this sector represents a very small part of Roman GDP. Services, the most
important sector of the Roman economy, representing 84.7% of the economy in 2005, grew
by 1.4%, well above the Italian average growth rate (0.8%).
According to Censis (2006), economic growth in Rome over the last years was determined
by the following five factors in particular:17
1. an increase in production, following reduction of the obstacles to entrepreneurship;
2. an improvement in the tertiary sector, particularly the advanced tertiary sector and
business services, despite the decreasing public sector;
3. the increasing role of utility firms (energy, communication, gas, water, etc.), with big
turnover and a high employment level;
4. the restructuring of industrial sectors, with the strengthening of some manufacturing
niches, such as electronics and biotechnology, together with the enormous growth in
the construction and financial sectors linked to the real estate;
5. the new role of Rome as the capital not only of mass tourism but also of new forms of
cultural events, festivals, cultural entertainments. Moreover, Rome became one of the
most important European cities for education, research and development, and
knowledge poles. 
The Roman economy grew during a modernization process in the 1990s and 2000s. More
recent economic growth confirms such a model. The Roman economy is no longer a
cumbersome system based on bureaucracy and national politics, capital city and headquarters
location of state-holding companies, as it used to be just after the second world war. However,
as in other metropolises, the emerging regime of accumulation in Rome is unstable, and is
characterized by a flexible mode of production with a crucial role assigned to the knowledge-
based economy. Although such a mode of production was functional to the economic growth
occurring over the past decade, it produced markedly uneven or multi-speed development, as
shown in the next section.
7. An overview of Rome from a human development perspective: multi-speed
development, and social exclusion
The idea that GDP is an absolute and reliable measure of development has been
widely criticized by development economists (Morris, 1979; Sen, 1981; Sen 1999). The
performance of countries in terms of GDP can be very different from that shown by basic
development indicators (Noorbakhsh, 1996). 
Starting from the difference between development and growth – and more specifically
between human development and economic growth – we try to investigate how the evolution
of Rome, as described in the previous sections, has affected people’s capabilities.18
In order to know whether a real enlargement of people choices and substantial
freedoms accompanied Rome’s positive economic performance in terms of traditional
indicators, we looked at some indicators of human development dimensions. However, since
building a local Human Development index for Rome may be difficult because of the paucity
of available official data
18,i tcould be useful to examine other indicators that capture different
key dimensions of human development.
Firstly, we can examine the employment rate. Employment provides people with
income that enables them to establish the command over a range of goods and services
needed to ensure a decent standard of living. It also encompasses all ways of securing a
livelihood, not just wage employment. People value their work for a number of reasons that
go beyond income. Work allows a productive contribution to society and an opportunity to
exercise skills and creativity. It brings strong recognition that fosters self-respect and dignity.
It gives the opportunity to participate in the collective effort, and to interact socially (HDR,
1996). Finally, a high level of employment also means a reduction in inequality between those
who earn an income and those who do not.
Labour market dynamics look much better in Rome than in Italy as a whole, and in
other important European cities. In Rome during 2000-06, the employment rate increased by
6.5% as compared with 5.9% in Lazio and 2.4% in Italy. 114.000 new jobs were created
during 2001-05. The rate of employment in Rome in 2005 was 60.5%, as compared with the
Italian employment rate of 57.5%, and the female rate of employment was 51.5% as
compared with 45.3% in Italy as a whole. At the same time, the unemployment rate went
down from 11.1% to 6.5%, to below the Italian average of 7.5% (Comune di Roma, 2006b). 
18 There are a few attempts in this direction. Monni (2002b) ranked the Italian provinces in terms of human
development. There, Rome appeared in 3
rd place while in terms of GDP its position is lower, 13
th place. At
regional level, Lazio appeared in tenth place among European Regions (EU15, NUTS 2), while in terms of
human development, Lazio was in 14
th place among the same European Regions (Monni, 2002a).19














Secondly, we can examine data concerning education. Education is key in promoting
human development and improving opportunities for the enlargement of choice. According to
UNDP (1990) «the good quality of education is so necessary for productive life in modern
society. Literacy is a person’s first step in learning and knowledge building. So if literacy
figures are essentials in any measurement of human development, in a more varied set of
indicators, importance would also have to be attached to the outputs of higher level of
education». Therefore, if in a low-income country, it is important to read and to write in order
to exercise one’s freedom, in a richer country we have to consider reaching a high level of
education as an essential component of the exercise of freedom (Sen, 1999)
19. Thus, following
Sen and UNDP, in the case of Rome we should focus on data concerning secondary and
tertiary education to capture a key dimension of human development. 
Tables 5 and 6 show that the percentage of people having a degree (BA) increased
from 8.6% to 13.3% between 1991 and 2001. Moreover, with regard to gender perspective –
another main aspect in human development – in 1991 60.4% of males had a BA title as against
19 «[…] freedom depends on a person’s ability to read and write. An illiterate person, for example, is not free to
read newspapers and exchange ideas in written form. As thought is influenced by the ability to read and write,
being illiterate conditions freedom of thought. Illiteracy is, therefore, lack of freedom”. As illiteracy is not a
common phenomenon in developed countries, it is clearly necessary to consider the standards in different
countries. In a wealthy country where people suffer fewer privations, the tendency will be to use a different
yardstick to assess whether or not a person has been deprived of freedom. Different layers of freedom can in fact
also be identified with regard to education. At more sophisticated levels, for example, an individual may wish to
obtain an academic qualification and justly consider himself deprived of a freedom if this should be denied to
him» (Sen, 1999).20
39.6% of females, while in 2001 the female BA population in Rome increased to 44.1% as
against a male BA population of 51.09%. People with secondary school degrees constituted
28.5% of the population in 1991 (48% male and 52% female); in 2001 the figure rose to
35.7% (46.8 male 53.2 female). Interestingly enough, Italian performance in education, as
shown in table 7, was lower than the Roman one, for the same indicator. 
Table 4. Education in Rome and Italy from 6 years old, 1991-2001
Rome Italy
1991 2001 1991 2001
Level of Education v.a. % v.a. % v.a. % v.a. %
Laurea (BA) 224760 8,6 320676 13,3 2,04763 3,8 3480535 6,5
High school (Diploma) 739765 28,5 862730 35,7 9937484 18,6 14485090 26,9
tot.laurea + diploma 964525 37,1 1183406 49 11985114 22,4 17965 33,4
Secondary school 782098 30,1 627792 26 16412499 30,7 16221737 30,1
Primary school  629153 24,2 427632 17,7 17405969 32,5 13686021 25,4
Alphabetic without title 204007 7,8 164412 6,8 6532658 12,2 5199237 9,7
Analphabetic 20072 0,8 12895 0,5 1145612 2,1 782342 1,5
Total 2559855 100 2416137 100 53481852 100 53854962 100
Source: Istat
Table 5. Education in Rome. Male and female from 6 years old, 1991-2001
Rome
1991 2001 Education level
Male Female Tot. Male Female Tot.
Laurea (BA) 135.735 89.025 224.760 166.534 154.142 320.676
% 60,4 39,6 100,0 51,9 48,1 100,0
High school 354.825 384.940 739.765 403.495 459.235 862.730
% 48,0 52,0 100,0 46,8 53,2 100,0
Secondary school  396.182 385.916 782.098 316.433 311.359 627.792
% 50,7 49,3 100,0 50,4 49,6 100,0
Primary school 259.256 369.897 629.153 172.768 254.864 427.632
% 41,2 58,8 100,0 40,4 59,6 100,0
Alphabetic without 
title 83.913 120.094 204.007 68.401 96.011 164.412
% 41.1 58,9 100,0 41,6 58,4 100,0
Analphabetic 5.957 14.115 20.072 3.907 8.988 12.895
% 29.7 70,3 100,0 30,3 69,7 100,0
Total 1.236.109 1.364.246 2.600.355 1.131.769 1.284.868 2.416.637
% 47.5 52,5 100,0 46,8 53,2 100,0
Source: Istat, census  2001
This brief human development analysis confirms that performance in terms of growth
in Rome was followed by an overall expansion of choices and freedom for individuals. Such a21
positive trend concerns two main human development dimensions, knowledge and
employment. A further issue is whether or not that expansion of choices is applicable to the
entire territory of Rome. In this sense the question is more complicated. A recent work of
Passacantilli (2003), who focuses specifically on human development disparities among the
neighbourhoods (i.e. sub-municipalities) of Rome, found that economic growth and human
development performance was not homogenously distributed in the territory. Using a
Municipal Human Development Indicator, he discovered that the level of human development
varied significantly within the 20 sub-municipalities of Rome. 
Differences are evident in terms of knowledge and longevity. In fact, the inhabitants of
eastern and peripheral sub-municipalities have worse access to knowledge and higher
mortality rates. Such a framework effectively describes the multi-speed model of Rome (table
8). It is important to notice that the income component of the municipal HDI (access to
resources) shows a narrow variance between sub-municipalities, while the other two non-
income components (knowledge and longevity) show a much wider variance. That result also
confirms two well known and related features: 1. the relation between income and human
development in not bijective; 2. inequality in the space of income is generally different from
inequality in the space of capability and can be lower. In the latter, as in the case of Rome, an
analysis in terms of income could hide, or underestimate, important aspects of inequality.22










1 0,839 0,530 0,968 0,779
2 0,938 0,687 1,000 0,875
3 0,878 0,596 1,000 0,825
4 0,839 0,552 0,823 0,738
5 0,763 0,412 0,664 0,613
6 0,766 0,373 0,821 0,653
7 0,734 0,323 0,784 0,613
8 0,743 0,274 0,651 0,556
9 0,838 0,517 0,871 0,742
10 0,795 0,437 0,754 0,662
11 0,873 0,553 0,838 0,754
12 0,876 0,639 0,708 0,741
13 0,818 0,484 0,671 0,658
15 0,789 0,418 0,768 0,658
16 0,845 0,556 0,868 0,756
17 0,875 0,602 0,937 0,805
18 0,802 0,486 0,840 0,709
19 0,813 0,494 0,840 0,716
20 0,860 0,610 0,771 0,747
Rome 0,815 0,492 0,800 0,702
Source: Passacantilli (2003)
On the basis of this analysis using a human development perspective, it seems
increasingly clear that two different cities are emerging in Rome. There is growing empirical
evidence of this dichotomy. One city is characterised by the KBE features described above;
these are represented by cultural events, social life in the city centre, intellectual activities,
political participation and civil society involvement, well paid jobs for skilled workers, etc.
The second Rome is the so-called “lower Rome”, in which many (old and new) social
problems can be traced: 1) labour flexibility, creating unstable and uncertain work situations,
which in turn increases poverty and insecurity; 2) social exclusion; 3) long term
unemployment; 4) housing problems; 5) very poor conditions for migrants; 6) decay of the
city peripheries; 7) congestion of spaces; 8) criminality; 9) illegal work and a black economy;
10) worsening of the quality of life (including pollution).
In particular, recent research commissioned from Censis (an Italian think thank) by the
regional government of Lazio, highlights socioeconomic disparities in Rome and in Lazio. It23
builds an indicator of intensity of socioeconomic problems for each province and for each
sub-municipality of Rome, which it calls the Socio-Economic Awkwardness Indicator
(Regione Lazio, 2002). Interestingly enough disparities found through such an indicator
correspond, with very few exceptions, to disparities pointed out by the municipal Human
Development indicator (table 7). In particular, the central-western neighbourhoods have
higher municipal HDI than the eastern and the peripheral sub-municipalities, as well as lower
Socio-Economic Awkwardness Indicator. Such results confirm that the composite index,
although based on the European average of Human development Index, varies consistently at
local level; some peripheral municipals have levels of HDI  lower than developing countries. 
The Socio-Economic Awkwardness Indicator (SEAI) is a composite index ranking
from 0, (minimum problems) to 100 (maximum problems). SEAI involves a wide range of
issues concerning the labour market, demographical aspects, the local economy, services
provision, and socioeconomic problems (such as: drug addiction, immigrants integration,
problems of elder people and of young people, etc). The methodology followed in this
research goes beyond traditional analysis of GDP and employment dynamics. On the
contrary, it is based on direct survey, with questionnaires and interviews. The results are quite
interesting and reveal that multi-speed development does exist in Rome. The celebrated
model of Rome, based on a knowledge economy and cultural events is coupled with a flip
side of the city, which is characterised, as in other metropolises, by an emerging new poor, an
underground economy, housing speculation, homelessness, drug addiction, lack of immigrant
integration, and social exclusion. 
Most of these problems, according to the SEAI, are concentrated in the peripheral
municipalities. Hence, while central sub-municipalities and some privileged districts enjoy all
the benefits of the new model of Rome (i.e., Knowledge economy and cultural events)
peripheral municipalities, poorer and less privileged districts suffer socioeconomic intensity
problems and gain very little from the Roman economic miracle. On the contrary, one could
say that many of their inhabitants have lost opportunities and income during the transition
towards a currently inadequately specified Roman model of a knowledge based economy.24
Table 7. Geography of the SEAI and of the HDI in Rome
Sub-
municipalities Socio-Economic Awkwardness 
Indicator (SEAI) 
Min 0 – Max 100





Min 0 - Max 1
(the higher the better)
2 29,9 2 0,875
3 35,3 3 0,825
9 40,8 17 0,805
11 44,4 1 0,779
12 45,6 16 0,756
19 49,2 11 0,754
20 49,2 20 0,747
1 50,8 9 0,742
5 51,4 12 0,741
16 51,8 4 0,738
17 52,4 19 0,716
18 52,4 18 0,709
4 57,8 10 0,662
10 59,7 13 0,658
6 61,4 15 0,658
13 62 6 0,653
7 65,2 5 0,613
15 67,1 7 0,613
8 73,6 8 0,556
Rome 52,6 Rome 0,702
Source: Regione Lazio (2002)  for SEAI; Passacantilli (2003)  for HDI.
Fifty percent of people working in the housing sector work illegally and without
protection. Illegal employment is strongly connected with accidents at work because of the
bad working conditions. Rome is the worst city in Italy for the number of deaths at work; in
2006, 16 workers died. The underground economy is estimated at around 25%, far above the
national average. More than half of the new jobs created during 2001-05 are flexible and
insecure; workers do not have social protection, full pension contributions, social rights etc.
The local and national public administration in Rome employs more than 100,000 workers in
such flexible and insecure jobs (Sviluppo Lazio, 2006), as happens also in other metropolises
experiencing similar transformation, such as Chicago, Manchester and Barcelona (Taylor,
2002).25
Data concerning the Gini coefficient
20 for Rome confirms the downsides of the
Roman development model. In the Province of Rome, the value of the Gini coefficient is
equal to 0.47%, which is the highest percentage among the Italian provinces and in Italy as a
whole (cf. table 8 below). At the same time, if we consider the median value of the income
per-capita instead of the average income per-capita, we discover that Rome, in terms of GDP,
is not the richest province in Lazio as it would appear from considering the average value.
Frosinone and Rieti, relatively poorer in average income, are richer than Rome. A similar
polarization is evident in the income disparities between women and men; the gap between
them in Rome is one of the widest in the Italian province at almost 8000, while the Italian
average is 6.410.
Table 8 – Income distribution, average and median among Italian provinces and in 
Italy. Private sector  2004
Province
Media Mediana Gini
Roma 19,512 15,259 0,476
Viterbo 13,905 11,869 0,429
Frosinone 15,275 15,278 0,371
Rieti 16,401 15,272 0,399
Latina 15,376 14,140 0,412
Milano 21,932 18,150 0,434
Torino 19,375 17,144 0,404
Bologna 19,163 16,974 0,391
Firenze 17,806 15,521 0,418
Napoli 14,783 13,440 0,408
Bari 14,089 13,125 0,393
Palermo 14,864 13,413 0,437
Italy 17,195 15,973 0.41%
Sources: INPS, 2005 (National Institute of Social Security)
20 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0
and 1: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution and the uniform (perfect)
distribution line; the denominator is the area under the uniform distribution. The higher the coefficient, the
higher the inequality of the income distribution.26
Table 9 - Income disparities between man and woman, euros, 2004
Provinces Females Males Difference
Roma 14,946 22,807 7,860
Viterbo 9,208 16,866 7,660
Frosinone 10,079 17,615 7,540
Rieti 12,627 18,173 5,550
Latina 11,055 17,244 6,190
Milano 17,319 25,38 8,060
Torino 14,435 22,896 8,460
Napoli 10,867 16,26 5,390
Bologna 14,892 22,708 7,720
Firenze 14,104 20,107 6,000
Bari 10,65 15,535 4,890
Palermo 12,068 15,983 3,920
ITALIA 12,967 19,424 6,460
Sources: INPS, 2005 (National Institute of Social Security)
Another negative aspect of the Roman polarization is the situation of migrants. There
are several neighbourhoods in Rome inhabited mainly by immigrants, who live in very bad
conditions. These concentrations inhibit integration into the local indigenous population,
despite the fact that, in 2004, the Municipality of Rome introduced active and passive
electoral rights for migrants. A large part of the migrant population works illegally and lives
in very bad conditions with an average of 10 people, often of the same ethnicity, sharing a
small house (Caritas, 2006). Thirty years ago the riverbanks of Rome were crowded with the
shacks of Italian migrants, mainly from the South. Today, no Italians live there anymore, but
4,000 people, mainly Roma, now attempt to survive in new riverbank shacks (Caritas, 2006).
The organisation of diversity in Rome, which constitutes one of the principal aspects
of metropolitan life, actually seems to be developing in certain peripheries; these have long
represented places of segregation and exclusion from the urban centre for the lower classes,
and today, they appear to be only partially reunited and integrated into an indistinct
uniformity. There are residential neighbourhoods for the white collar middle class, but in the
majority of cases the lower classes and the immigrants are even more segregated and exclude
by dull and unwelcoming public housing projects that reproduce forms of isolation and
marginalisation; here unfurls the hardship of a part of the city that is restless and unable to
formulate a project for its own future.
According to Lucciarini and Violante (2007), there is a process of urban polarisation
in Rome, which is well represented by “where social classes are residents”: businessmen are27
concentrated in the innermost central districts of the city (No.1 and 2) and in the best
residential areas (in the north part of district No.20); the working classes are mostly
concentrated in the districts just outside the most central ones; the density of the elderly in the
city centre districts is very high. Such data suggest that the urban polarisation process is a
relatively new phenomenon, and this confirms our thesis concerning the polarisation of
Rome’s economy during the current transition towards so called “modernization”. Finally,
migrants (and in particular Chinese, Rumanians, Bengalis and Filipinos) are mostly
concentrated in the worst parts of some peripheral sub-municipalities (5-7-8, in the East; and
10-12 in the South). 
The public housing sector, which built such historic working-class neighbourhoods in
Rome as Testaccio, Garbatella and San Saba, has also intervened in the periphery, with
projects such as Tor Bella Monaca, Laurentino 38 and Corviale. Although often sites of
isolation, abandonment, troubled youth and conflict, these peripheries can, where they are
more indistinct and generic, fuel the organisation of diversity that, in Rome, occurs in the
most unexpected places, for example in the periphery, almost as a reaction to the domination
of the centre. But the presence of a growing isolation in the city produces yet another
typically metropolitan phenomenon: it fuels fear, especially among the middle classes. Even
in the Roman scenario, the need to enclose oneself in a private sphere within the city prevails
over the need to create a safe city for the entire social community. Hence, the perception of
danger and the need for safety can open space for the growth of intolerance and so contribute
to the failure of migrant friendly policies. At the same time, this should push policy makers to
understand that migrant friendly policies are more effective when they are applied within a
global context of tolerance, of urban integration, of socially oriented policies and of housing
policies that avoid ‘ghettoisation‘ and migrant isolation.
According to Ferrarotti and Macioti (2006), peripheries have changed enormously in
the last thirty years. However, social exclusion, poverty and social problems have not
disappeared; they have just changed in form. People living in these peripheries, far from the
city and from the main political economic and social centres, have no concept of the new
economic model of Rome, made up of KBE and political participation. They are not
consumers of cultural events organised for the knowledge society. On the contrary, they
survive in an ugly cultural and social environment, consisting largely of gender
discrimination, criminality, precarious conditions of work, low income, and “bullish”
behaviour, all of which have a bad effect on quality of life. Cultural and social centres are
unusual and education levels are relatively low in comparison with the Italian average.28
Municipal policies to combat such phenomena are inadequate and fragmented. There
is little or no socio-cultural- planning to cope with such problems. It seems that the new forms
of social participation introduced recently by the municipal government, and discussed above,
fail to reach such distant peripheries; in fact the democratisation process basically stops with
the provision of the right to vote.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we argued that the Roman socio-economic model contains important
elements of social innovation and democratic process, such as power decentralization from
the city council to the sub-municipalities, political rights to migrants, dialogue with social
movements, participatory budget, the Pact of Rome, etc. These are mainly the result of
important changes experienced by the city over the last thirty years. The transformation, itself
was a consequence of cultural change, social movements and political change that had already
occurred during the 1970s, and involved, above all, economic and social actors, political
relations and power relations.
From an economic point of view, this new model is mainly characterized by a path of
growth more oriented towards the advanced tertiary sector, i.e. research and higher education
business services, cultural industry, etc. This allowed the city’s economy to expand
consistently in recent years. The good economic performance is also accompanied by an
overall increase in human development factors. However, the Roman model is characterized
at the same time by acute forms of social exclusion and polarization between peripheries and
central/wealthy districts in a type of multi-speed development. This territorial polarization
reflects the polarization between different socio-economic groups and classes. In fact, large
parts of society did not enjoy the benefits of the advanced tertiary economy growth; a new
poor stratum has emerged; forms of social exclusion affect the unskilled; the middle class
suffers an increased cost of living; booming house prices exclude a large part of the lower-
middle class from buying a house; renting a house is very expensive; inequality is rising. In
other words, although resources abound, many people are excluded from opulence because of
lack of opportunities, knowledge, inclusive social relations, appropriate institutions, etc
Analysing Rome’s economy through a human development perspective showed GDP growth
in aggregate terms, but also revealed uneven human development and huge disparities
between central-western and peripheral eastern sub-municipalities. Such disparities are
overlooked in an analysis of the Roman model, which uses only traditional economic
indicators such as aggregate GDP, labour market dynamics, and production indicators.29
The new renaissance in Rome, lauded by mayor Veltroni (2007), is not for all Roman
residents.
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